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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DR. R. B. LINDSAY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

Case No. 8492

JENNIE WOODWARD,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

This is an appeal by tTennie Woodward from a
Summary Judgment entered against her by the Third
District Court of Salt Lake County, dismissing her
Amended Counterclaim to the Complaint of Dr. R. B.
Lindsay, who brought suit against her to recover the
reasonable value of medical services. The appeal evolved
from these facts :
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 8, 1952, Jennie Woodward, defendant and
appellant, herein referred to as defendant, was injured
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in an .automobile accident at Cokeville, Wyoming. De
fend.ant's sister telephoned plaintiff and respondent, Dr.
R. B. Lindsay, herein referred to as plaintiff, at Mont' Idaho, to secure medical treatrnent for defendant.
pelier,
Plaintiff immediately drove to Cokeville, a distancr
of some 32 miles and examined defendant, whereupon
defendant was taken to the Bear L.ake Memorial Hospital in Montpelier.
Defendant was attended by plaintiff during her hospitalization, which lasted approximately one month (Deposition, p. 32). On .July 29, 1952, a brace applied by
plaintiff was removed. This was the last time defendant
was treated by plaintiff (Deposition, p. 43).
In August of 1952, defendant consulted an attorney
to represent her in asserting a clailn for personal injuries against the driver pf the other automobile involved
in the accident (Deposition, p. 62). Later defendant filed
suit in Wyoming.
By her Amended Petition in the \\~yoming suit filed
May 29, 1953, defendant sought reeoYery of $27,405.31
as damages for the following injuries: fracture of left
clavicle; fracture of fourth, fifth, and sixth ribs, left
side; fracture of seventh and eight yertebra; severe
trauma and spraining of the pelYis articulation .and junctions; severe trauma of the thoracic visera and severe
traumatic pleurisy; arthritis of left shoulder and arm,
right shoulder and neck, lower back and both legs, and
pain and shock (R. 17, 19).
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It was alleged that these injuries were permanent
(R. 17). Defendant also sought certain special damages,
including amount of plaintiff's bill for professional services, that of Dr. Paul, Salt L~ke City, that of Dr. H.
K. Rock, Kemmerer, Wyoming, and including travel
expense to Salt Lake City, Utah, for an examination by
Dr. L. N. Ossman (R. 21).
On August 27, 1954, the Wyoming suit was settled.
Defendant executed a release of all claims and judgment of dismissal with prejudice and on the merits was
entered by the Court pursuant to stipulation (R. 22).
On August 17, 1955, plaintiff filed the instant suit
against defendant to recover $225.00, for medical services rendered (R. 1). This suit was filed in the City
Court of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah, defendant having by this time taken up residence in Salt
Lake City. Defendant m.ade no appearance in this case
and judgment by default was entered on September 7,
1955 for the relief dernanded in the complaint (R. 2).
Defendant filed notice of appeal on October 1, 1955,
and after the appeal was taken and the cause transferred
to the District Court of S.alt Lake County, and as a part
of the appellate proceedings, defendant filed a counterclaim seeking recovery of damages in the amount of
$40,000.00 for alleged malpractice (R. 4, 5).
Plaintiff nwved to dismiss this counterclaim upon
the ground, arnong others, that the relief demanded exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ceeded the jurisdiction of the City Court and hence exceeded the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court
(R. 6).
This motion w.as denied on December 5, 1955, and
on December 19, 1955, plaintiff filed a l\1otion for Summary Judgn1ent with attached Affidavit, setting up the
release and the applicable statute of limitations. In order
to protect the record, plaintiff also included the ground
of excess of jurisdiction, plaintiff feeling that it was
necessary under Utah decisions to .assert this defense at
every stage of the proceedings. This latter ground was
not argued, however, it being explained to the Court
by counsel for plaintiff that a ruling had previouusly
been made upon this particular defense (R. 12, 22).
After argu1nent, Judge Ray Yan Cott, Jr. granted
plaintiff's Motion for Su1n1nary Judgment (R. 23, 2-±).
This appeal followed.
STATE1fENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE CLAIM SET FORTH IN DEFENDANT'S AMENDED
COUNTERCLAIM IS BARRED BY HER RELEASE AND
THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL IN THE WYOMING A·CTION.

POINT II.
THE CLAIM SET FORTH IN DEFENDANT'S AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM IS BARRED BY LIMITATION.
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POINT III.
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER
DEFENDANT'S AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM BE•CAUSE
THE COUNTERCLAIM EXCEEDED THE JURISDICTION
OF THE CITY COURT OF SALT LAKE •CITY, AND THEREFORE EXCEEDED THE JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT
COURT ON APPEAL.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE CLAIM SET FORTH IN DEFENDANT'S AMENDED
COUNTERCLAIM IS BARRED BY HER RELEASE AND
THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL IN THE WYOMING ACTION.

The release executed by defendant in this case was
apparently executed in Wyoming, and under general
principles of Conflict of Laws, the effect of the release
would be governed by the law of Wyoming, 76 C.J.S.
671 (Release, Sec. 39). Our research, however, has failed
to reveal .any Wyoming decisions applicable to the facts
of this case. We, of necessity, therefore, have directed
our research to decisions of other jurisdictions.
By the great weight of authority, a general release
executed in favor of one responsible for the plaintiff'~
original injury, is a bar to an action against a physician
for damages incurred by his negligent treatment of that
injury. 40 A.L.R. (2d) 1075 (Release of One Responsible
for Injury as Affec6ng Liability of Physician or Surgeon for Negligent Treatment of Injury).
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A decision illustrating this well settled principle
is Thompso.n v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209, 192 A. 107, 112 A.L.R.
550 (1937). In that case plaintiff was struck by an autoroo bile on November 21, 1932, and as a result suffered
injuries, the most serious of which was a fracture of
the neck of the right femur. He was immediately attended by defendant, a practicing physician, and remained under his care until11ay 1933. In October, 1933,
plaintiff brought suit ag.ainst the driver to recover
damages for injuries sustained as a result of the accident, including the fracture of the hip, which he alleged
left him permanently lame and crippled.

On July 25, 1934, plaintiff settled the suit and released the responsible party " ... of and frmn all, and all
manner, of actions and causes of action ... clainis and
demands whatsoever ... " arising out of the accident.
On 1farch 4, 1935, plaintiff brought this suit, alleging
that defendant carelessly and ilnproperly treated the
fracture and did not set it in accordance "ith surgical
and medical s,tandards. A.t the trial of this suit, the
court directed a verdict for defendant. Plaintiff appealed. The Pennsylvania Supre1ne Court said:
"There is apparently no case in this state directly in point, but the detennining principles of
law are as well established in PPnnsYlYania as elsewhere. Other jurisdictions have held. with almost
cmnplete nnanimih-. that there can be no recoverv
in such a suit ag~~in~t a physician for neglige~t
aggrav.ation of injuries. after a settle1nent effected with the tort-feasor who caused the accident. (Cases cited.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"In the action against Taylor, plaintiff's recovery for the injury to his hip would have included the added damage caused by the alleged
negligence of defendant. Doctors, being human,
.are apt occasionally to lapse from prescribed
standards, and the likelihood of carelessness, lack
of judgment or of skill, on the part of one employed to effect the cure of a condition caused
by another's act, is therefore considered in law
as an incident of the original injury, and if the
injured party has used ordinary care in the selection of .a physician or surgeon, any additional
harm resulting from the latter's mistake or negligence is considered as one of the elements of the
damages for which the original wrongdoer is liable. (Cases cited. Citing also Sec. 457 of the ·
Restatement of the law of Torts.)
"Such being the law, for the final condition
of his hip plaintiff could have sued, and did sue,
Taylor; for the aggravation of the original condition plaintiff could have sued, and did sue, defendant. He could have pursued both actions to
judgment. For ·the same injury, however, an injured party c.an have but one satisfaction and
the receipt of such satisfaction, either as payment of a judgment recovered or consideration for
a release executed by him, from a person liable
for such injury, necessarily works a release of
all others liable for the same injury and prevents any further proceedings .against them
(Case~ cited.) This is true even though it was
intended, or the release expressly stipula;ted that
the other wrongdoers should not thereby be released. (Cases cited.) Nor is it materia! whether
the tort-feasors involved committed a "joint tort
of concurrent or successive torts, because the
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principle which underlies the rule is that the
injured party is given a legal remedy only
to obtain compensation for the damage done
to him, and when that compensation has been received from any of the wrongdoers, his right to
further remedy is at an end. Of course, if a tortfeasor is liable only for a part of the damage, and
another tort-feasor is liable only for another part
. . . a release of one does not release the other;
but where both are liable for the same damage,
nor matter upon what theory their respective liabilities are predicated, the rule applies. Since
plaintiff, by settling with Taylor, was compensated for all injuries, both those originally and
those ultimately arising out of the accident, including the aggravation of the hip condition by
defendant's alleged negligence, he cannot obtain
from defendant a second satisfaction for the same
damage."
The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.
See also Phillips v. W erndorff, 215 Ia. 521, 2±3 N. \V.
525 (1932) where the Supreme Court of Iowa observed:
"The receipt was clearly designed to release
the original wrongdoer frmn all and every claim
of every kind against then1. This necessarily included the aggravation of the original injury by
the .alleged unskillful and negligent treatment
thereof by Appellee."
Other cases illustrating this rule are: Be11esh r. Garvais, 221 Minn. 1, 20 N. \V. (2d) 532 (19±5): Sams v.
Curfman, et al (Colorado, 1943) 137 P. (~d) 1017.

'

Additional cases are cited in the annotation previously referred to found at 40 A.L.R. (2d) 1075, and in
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the Note at 39 N.C.C.A. 558, entitled, "Disease or Aggrav.ation of Injury Due to Malpractice of Physician Attending Injured Person as Element of Damages Recoverable from Original Tort Feasor," and particularly
Part II thereof entitled, "Settlement with Original Tort
Feasor as Releasing Physician."
Defendant, apparently conceding that her appeal is
without merit under the rule adopted by the majority
of the courts, urges that this court apply the rule which
defendant asser,ts is applied in California. Two California decisions are cited - Ash v. Mortenson, 24 Cal.
(2d) 654, 150 P. (2d) 876 (1944) and Dickow v. Cookingham 123 Cal. App. (2d) 81, 266 P. (2d) 63 (1954).
The view taken in these cases is perhaps best illustr·ated by this excerpt from Ash v. Mortenson:
"We are of the opinion that a release of the
original wrongdoer should release an attending
doctor from liability for aggravation of the injury
if there has been full compensation for both injuries, but not otherwise."
While the facts in those cases may easily be distinguished from those of the instant case, the rationale
of those decisions would appear to require inquiry into
the extent of the claim asserted in the first suit as contrasted with that asserted in the subsequent suit. This,
of course, is the only way it can be determined whether
compensation was received for a particular injury. See
Wheat v. Carter, 79 N.H. 150, 106 A. 602 (1919), cited
by defendant.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Even if this approach be taken, however, the undisputed facts compel the conclusion· reached by the trial
court. Here defendant makes no claim which was not
asserted by her in the previous suit, as appears from
the following tabulation:

Present Action

I

Prior Action

" . . . permanently injured in her health and constitution and suffered and
continues to suffer great
pain." (R. 10)

permanently in"
jured... (R. 17)
" . . . great and intense
pain ... " (R. 19)

" . . . permanent injury

fracture of the
"
body of the seventh and
eighth vertebra . . . " (R.
17)

to her back ... " (R. 10)

"

shoulder

(R. 10)

"

I

" ... legs ... " (R. 10)
"
H

..

I

. body . . . (R. 10)

... hips ... " (R. 10)

I

left clavicle was
"
fracturc:d . . . " (R. 17)

" . . upper portion of
both legs . . . " (R. 17)
" .. severe injury to
said Mary Jane Woodward
. .. " (R. 17)
" . . . pelvis articulation
and junctions ... " (R. 17)

mind and entire
"
nervous system . . . " (R.
10).

severe and pro·
"
found shock to her nervous
system . . . " (R. 19)

" . . . crippled ... "(R.

Arthritic condi"
tions ... " (R. 17)

10)

I

In response to questions about her present complaints, defendant n1ade these answers in her deposition:
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"Q. 1-I.ave you had these complaints which
you have at this time since the accident~
"A. Yes.

* * *
"Q. In general, do you have the same complaints now that you had after the accident'
"A. Oh sure, only that the condition is-it
isn't getting any better, see, it is just getting
worse.

* *

:t:

"Q. . .. And did you tell your attorney what
injuries you had at that time'
"A. Yes, and the attorney knows because
he has the medical reports from four doctors.

"Q. And did you tell him about the same
complaints that you have told us about here today'
"A. Yes sure.

"Q. And he had talked to these four doctors
you say'
"A. He has the medical reports from the
four doctors.

"Q. And did he sue for those injuries which
you have described here today~
"A. Yes.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Q. And did you bring that suit against l\1:r.
Olsen who was driving the other car~
"A. Yes.

"Q. And then you settled that law suit did
you

not~

"A. Yes.
(See deposition, pp 61-3)
The release executed by the defendant in settlement
of that action provided as follows :
"FOR THE SOLE CONSIDERATION OF
Fifty-seven Hundred fifty Dollars, the receipt and
sufficiency whereof is hereby acknowledged the
undersigned hereby releases and forever discharges L. K. Olson and State F.arm l\futual Automobile Insurance Co., their heirs, executors, administrators, agents and assigns, and all other
persons, finns or corporations liable, or who
might be claimed to be liable, none of whom admit
any liability to the undersigned but all expressly
deny any liability frmn any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action or suits
of any kind or nature whatsoever, and particularly on account of all injuries, known and unknown,
both to persons or property, 'vhich have resulted
or may, in the future develop from an accident
which occurred on or .about the 8th day of June,
1952 at or near Cokeville, 'Yymning.
"Undersigned hereby declares that the terms
of this settlement have been con1pletely read and
are fully understood and voluntarily accepted for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the purpose of rnaking a full and final compromise
adjustment and settlement of any and all claims,
disputed or otherwise, on account of the injuries
and damages above mentioned.
"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 27th day of August,
1954.

jsj Mary Jane Woodward (SEAL)
In Presence of

jsj E. J. Herschler"
(See copy between R. 21 and R. 22).
Even though the release specifically includes unknown injuries, defendant attempts to avoid the effect
of this release by contending that she did not know until
years after the settlement that her hip was injured
(Brief, page 7). Defendant makes reference to page 48,
line 10 of her deposition to support this assertion. The
statement made on page 48 at line 10 is:
"And now I found out that this socket, this
hip socket was knocked out (indicating), and that
constant three and a half years' motion has worn
that right thin. "
On page 18 of her deposition, however, defendant
testifies as follows :

"Q. Did you have any specific pains other
than the one in your shoulder and the one in your
back, on that occasion (the first afternoon or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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evening following the accident), do you

recall~

"A. Well, down through my hips, but as
e.ach day went on, see, they got worse.

"Q. You had pain in your hips~
"A. Yes and I still do.''
Also, reference to hip injuries is made in the
amended petition where complaint is made of injury to
the pelvis articulation and junctions (R. 17).
Defendant also seeks to avoid the release upon the
ground that "separate torts" where committed by the
defendant (Brief, page 8). In her deposition, however,
defendant complained only of the following against the
plaintiff: alleged failure to take X-rays, failure to fix
her fractured shoulder, failure to treat the injury to her
pelvis, hips and back, and failure to build up her general
physical condition (Deposition, pages 65-67). There 1~
no assertion that the alleged conduct of the pl.aintiff did
any more than aggravate an original injury.
Contrast the undisputed evidence in this case with
the facts in Mainfort v. Gianuestras, 49 Ohio Ops. -±±0,
111 D. E. (2d) 692 (1951), relied upon by defendant a&
authority for her "sep,arate tort" theory. In that case
plaintiff's leg was shortened 1lh inches as a result of
an accident. Plaintiff executed a release of all claims.
Thereafter plaintiff en1ployed defendant to lengthen his
leg. When the result of this operation was unsatisfactory, plaintiff sued for malpractice.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Defendant demurred on the ground that plaintiff
had signed a general release.
Plaintiff contended the rule holding a release of the
original wrongdoer discharges the physician applied only
to negligence of physician occurring prior to the release.
It was held, however, that the rule was not so limited.
F.ar from supporting defendant, the language from
this case, quoted at page 8 of her brief, is fatal to her
position when the facts of the case are considered.
Defendant also relies upon Corbet v. Clark, 187 Va.
222, 46 S. E. (2d) 327 (1948) to support this theory.
Even a cursory examination of the facts there involved
points up the very weakness of defendant's argument in
this c.ase. There one dentist left the root of a tooth in
plaintiff's gum. A second dentist was alleged to have
been negligent in extracting a different tooth and release
of the first dentist was held not to discharge the second.
It is obvious that the second dentist was not employed
to treat plaintiff for injuries resulting from the negligence of the first and hence the question here involved
and the rule generally recognized does not even come
into operation.
Defendant also now claims that a separate tort was
committed by plaintiff in "fraudulent misrepresentation
and concealment" (Brief, page 9). At no time, however,
is it explained how such could have in any way caused
the damages of which defendant complains. The most
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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alleged is that plaintiff Inisrepresented the true condition of defendant and induced her to refrain from consulting other physicians, that she might learn the true
condition proximately caused by the negligence and malpractice of plaintiff (R. 10). As a matter of fact, however, it is undisputed that defendant was examined by
four medical doctors prior to settling her action (page
63). She has seen none additional since. (R. 2.1, Deposition, pp, 63, 71, 73), and she admits these doctors told her
she had a permanent disability. (Dep. pp 50, 54).
By way of final attempt to avoid application of the
almost universal rule previously stated, defendant suggests that her cause of action against plaintiff really is
for breach of contract. Courts have long ago learned to
perceive the difference between the form and the substance of an action. A similar argument was made and
rejected in Sams v. Curfmann, et al., (Colorado, 1943)
137 P. (2d) 1017. However designated, what defendant
actually complains of in this case is alleged negligence
upon the part of plaintiff.
Under this "contract" theory defendant refers to
Van Blumenthal v. Cassola et al., (Sup. Ct. of N. Y.,
1938), 3 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 246, erroneously cited by defendant as Bur v. BZ.umenthal 2 N.Y. Supp. 246. While
its holding is somewhat difficult to perceive, it appears
contra to the decision of the N.Y. Court of Appeals in
Milks et al v. Mciver et al., 264 N.Y. 267, 190 N. E. 487
(1936) In any event, defendant does not claim plaintiff
contracted to produce a complete recovery from plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tiff's injuries, as in the Cassola case where the breach
consisted in permitting the p.atient to die.
This Court's attention should perhaps be directed
to the fact that defendant repeatedly refers to the allegations of her counterclaim as facts. Such is not the
rule, however, on motions for summary judgment.
Schess.ler v. Keck, (Calif., 1956) 292 P. (2d) 314.
In summary, whether the rule followed in the
majority of jurisdictions be adopted, or the "minority
rule", it is without dispute that defendant now complains
against plaintiff for the same injuries she complained
of in the prior suit, which suit was fully settled and
satisfied. This settlement was made two years after
all treatment by plaintiff had terminated - after she
had consulted an attorney - after she had been examined
by four doctors. And, significantly, only after judgment
by default had been entered against her for the value
of the services performed by plaintiff, was a counterclaim asserted.
POINT II.
THE CLAIM SET FORTH IN DEFENDANT'S AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM IS BARRED BY LIMITATION.

Section 78-12-45, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides:
"When a cause of action has arisen in another
state or territory, or in a foreign country, and
by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot there
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be maintained against a person by reason of the
lapse of time, an action thereon shall not be maintained against him in this state, except in favor
of one who has been a citizen of this state and
who had held the cause of action from the time
it accrued."
The claim which defendant now asserts in her
Arnended Counterclaim arose in the State of Idaho, since
that is where Plaintiff's allegedly improper professional
services were performed. The statutes of the State of
Idaho provide that an action for personal injuries is
barred unless the same is instituted within two years
after the date the cause of action accrued (R. 15).
It is undisputed that no services of any kind were
performed by plaintiff after July 29, 1952 (Deposition,
p. 43). It is also undisputed that defendant was not
a citizen of the State of Utah at the time this cause of
action accrued (Dep. pp. 47, 48).
It would seem to follow, without citation of authority,
that the cause of action set forth in the An1ended Counterclaim of defendant is barred by limitation.
To escape this obvious conclusion, defendant claims
that plaintiff concealed the true nature of her injuries
and misrepresented her condition so that she did not
discover the true facts until N ove1nber, 1955. She apparently relies upon Peteler v. Robinson, 81 Utah 535,
17 P. (2d) 244 (1932).
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In the Peteler case, however, it was specifically
pointed out that the plaintiff was treated to and including October 22, 1926, long after the alleged negligent act
occurred. The action was commenced January 24, 1927.
In this case the full term of the statute of limitations
ran between the date of the final treatment given defendant by plaintiff. 'rhere was no continuing negligence
and conce.alment, as alleged in the Peteler case.
Nevertheless, it would seem material, in determining whether or not the action was barred in Idaho, to
make examination of Idaho decisions. A decision strikingly to similar to this case is Trimming v. Howard, (Idaho,
1932) 16 P. (2d) 661. In that case the plaintiff sued for
damages arising when he employed the defendant physician to treat him for spinal meningitis. Plaintiff alleged
that defendant attempted to inject into his spinal column
a certain serum by means of a hypodermic syringe, but
that he broke off a portion of the needle in his back; that
he failed in his contractual duty to skillfully and carefully treat the plaintiff and to remove the needle, and
that the physician knowingly and falsely represented
that the needle had been removed and that plaintiff did
not discover the falsity of this representation until June
25, 1930. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence .a
non-suit was entered on the ground that the action was
barred by the statute of limitations.
The Supreme Court of Idaho said that the action
was one arising out of a tort rather than contract .and
that the cause of action was nothing but malpractice,
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which is negligence. The Court commented that the appropriate statute of limitations is determined by the
substance, not the form of the achon, and that as such
the two year limitation period applies.
As to the claim of fraud, the court held that this
was not in substance an action for fraud, and that since
the wrong arose not from the fraud, but from the negligence, it could not be governed by the fraud statute of
limitations. The Court observed that the cause of action
arose on July 4, 1926, when the broken needle was left
in plaintiff's back and since two years and eleven months
had elapsed between the plaintiff's majority and the filing of his complaint, the action was barred by the two
year limitation. The judgment of non-suit was affirmed.
This decision would seem to dispose also of the contention made that the statute of limitations applicable
to fraud cases (Defendant's Brief, p. 11) or that applicable to contract cases (Brief, p. 12) is controlling.
The rather parenthetical contention that perhaps
the law of Wyoming governs this case since the "contract" was made there, is contradicted by defendant's
own Amended Counterclailn, wherein she stated that
plaintiff, Dr. R. B. Lindsay, is and was at the time of
said accident, a licensed and practicing physician in
Montpelier, Idaho, and the defendant :Mary Jane Woodward, employed the plaintiff Dr. R. B. Lindsay, as such
on or about the 8th day of June, 1952, at said place,
(Emphasis added).
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POINT III.
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER
DEFENDANT'S AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM BEoCAUSE
THE COUNTERCLAIM EXCEEDED THE JURISDICTION
OF THE CITY COURT OF SALT LAKE .CITY, AND THEREFORE EXCEEDED THE JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT
COURT ON APPEAL.

This defense w.as first raised by Motion to Dismiss,
which Motion, after argument, was denied. No argument
was made upon this point at the ti1ne of hearing the Motion for Summary Judgment, since, as was explained to
the court, the matter had previously been submitted in
a former hearing. This defense, however, was reasserted,
since under the .authority of Burt & Car.lquist Co. v.
Marks, et al, 53 Utah 'l7, 177 P. 224 (1918), this defense
can be waived by failure to assert at each opportunity.
Plaintiff desires, therefore, to present briefly at
this time the authorities in support of this contention.
Plaintiff believes matters of jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action ought to be considered by appellate courts at all stages of the proceedings.
It will be recalled that defendant in the instant case
appealed to the District Court after judgment had been
entered against her by the City Court of Salt Lake City
in the amount of $268.83, due for services rendered. After
the appeal was filed, the counterclaim of $40,000.00 was
asserted by defendant, although she had not even entered
an appearance in the City Court case.
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In Hardy v. Meadows, et al, 71 Utah 255, 264 P.
968 (1928), llubbard, a doctor practicing in Carbon
County, operated upon Meadows for appendicitis. Meadows shortly thereafter moved to Salt Lake City. In
November, 1925, Meadows brought suit in the District
Court in Carbon County against Dr. Hubbard for $5,750.00 damages for malpractice, which suit was later dismissed. An answer was filed in this case. In the meantirne Hubbard assigned his claim for $125.00 for professional services to Hardy, who brought suit on April
1, 1926, in the City C.-)urt of Salt Lake City for $125.00.
On April 21, Meadows appe.ared and obtained the order
interpleading Dr. Hubbard. A counterclaim was thereupon filed against Dr. Hubbard for $5,750.00 damages.
Hubbard filed a demurrer on the ground that the counterclaint was not pleadable as a counterclaim in the action and that the City Court did not have jurisdiction of
the subject n1atter of the counterclai1n nor of the cause
of action therein alleged. This demurrer was overruled
and Hubbard then answered denying negligence.
;j

Court judgment was

ft

rendered for Me.adows for $87 4.99 against Hubbard. This

I

At the trial before the

Cit~·

judgment was appealed to the District Court of Salt Lake
County.
When the case

wa~

set for trial before the Dis-

trict Court of Salt Lake County, Hubbard urged by
motion that the City Court had no jurisdiction of the
subject utatter of the counterclahn and that therefore
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the District Court did not acquire jurisdiction by the
appeal, except to set aside the judgment of the City Court
and to dismiss the action. The motion was overruled and
the District Court proceeded to trial before a jury.
During the trial, but before submission of the cause,
:Meadows amended his counterclaim by striking the
figures $5,750.00 and inserting in lieu thereof $1,000.00.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Hardy and
against l\ieadows for $125.00 and in favor of Meadows
and against Hubbard for $1,000.00. .Judgment was then
entered and this appeal taken.
Meadows contended on appeal that even though the
City Court did not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the counterclaim, the District Court, being a court
of both appellate and original jurisdiction, had jurisdiction to try the issues to the full extent as set forth in the
City Court.
Our Supreme Court observed the jurisdiction of the
City Court to entertain the counterclaim was timely challenged by the demurrer and that in the District Court
also such jurisdiction was again timely challenged.
The Court said:
"The effeC't of the holdings in all of these
cases is that the jurisdiction of the District Court
of a cause on appeal from a justice's court, or
from other inferior court is derivative and as
is held in many other jurisdictions; that if the
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inferior court had not jurisdiction of the cause
and of the subject-matter therein presented, the
district court .acquired no jurisdiction thereof by
appeal ...

* * *
" * * * Whatever may be the rule elsewhere,
the one declared by and to which this court is
committed, that when the inferior court is without jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the subject-matter of an action commenced therein, the
district court to which the case is appealed does
not acquire jurisdiction of the action though the
district court would have original jurisdiction of
such subject matter if by an original action such
jurisdiction is invoked is a wholesome rule and
one founded on basic principles.
"The conclusion thus reached by us is that
since the City Court did not have jurisdiction of
the subject matter presented by the counterclaim,
the District Court, by appeal, did not acquire nor
w:as it vested with jurisdiction to hear or try the
counterclaim on 1nerits, and the judgment rendered on the counterclaim by the City Court and
· the District Court are nullities and should be
vacated."
The case was remanded to the District Court with
directions that judg1nent be rendered in accordance with
the decision.
The rule that a eourt of general jurisdiction h~
only the jurisdiction of the inferior court when a matter
is heard on appeal dates back to the earliest reported
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25

decisions in the western states. For example, see Wagstaff v. Challiss (Kansas, 1884) 1 P. 631.
This is the rule in Idaho. In Albinola v. Horning,
et al (Idaho, 1924), 227 P. 1054, an action was begun in
a justice's court to r8cover $288.00 due from defendant
to plaintiff on account of a sale of stock. Defendant
denied the allegations of the complaint, and upon trial,
judgment went for the plaintiff; the defendant appealed
to the District Court.
In the District Court, the defendant amended its
answer .and filed a cross-complaint, seeking $950.00 on
account of a fraudulent conveyance of the stock, that
sum being the amount paid plaintiff for the repurchase
of the corporation's own stock. Plaintiff demurred to
the cross-complaint and the den1urrer was overruled.
Upon motion of the defendant for judgment upon the
pleadings, judgment was entered for the defendant and
against the plaintiff in the amount of $1,141.05. The
plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho, alleging that the District Court committed error in that it was
without jurisdiction of the cross-complaint and that the
judgment w.as in excess of the jurisdiction of the justiee
court.
The Court said:
"In this state the jurisdiction of the district
court on appeal from a justice court is purely derivative, and, if the justice had no jurisdiction in
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the purpose of expediting procedure and obviating trials where no genuine issue of fact exists."
Ulibarri v. Christenson (Utah, 1954) 275 P. (2d)
170.
Under the undisputed facts appearing from the record in this case, defendant has fully settled and compromised the claim which she now asserts ; this claim iR
barred by limitation; and the District Court is without jurisdiction to hear and determine it. This being
so, the District Court properly granted plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment upon the issues raised by
defendant's counterclaim. That judgment ought to be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HAROLD G..CHRISTENSEN
JOHN H. SNOW

.Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
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